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I. Introduction
Recent research on the design of regulatory institutions places substantial emphasis
on the role of the Courts as supporting the interests of the enacting coalition (McCubbins,
Noll and Weingast (1987), (1989)). There has been, however, very little analytical work on
the role of the judicial system in constraining agency discretion, when the judiciary is
modeled as a self-interested ideologically motivated institution. 1 Gely and Spiller (1990a),
for example, have suggested that such a role will not follow if the Courts are modeled as
self interested, ideologically motivated institutions, making decisions subject not to the
traditional legal rules of precedent, but to the constraints imposed by the other institutions
of government (e.g. Congress, the President). In their basic framework there is no discretion
left to the agency, as the Supreme Court will reverse any administrative decision that does
not maximize the Court's own preferences, subject to not being reversed by Congress. Not
only judicial review eliminates agency discretion, but in their framework it also eliminates
the power of the status quo. In particular, committees cannot rely on judicial review of
regulatory actions to block agency decisions when they follow adverse changes in the
composition of Congress.
The basic SC framework has two major assumptions behind their result on agency
discretion: first, SG assume that in interpreting legislative statutes the Court is free to
choose any point in the policy space. 2 Second, SG assume that making decisions is costless
to the Court. In their framework, then, the equilibrium consists of a policy outcome such
that it maximizes the Court's utility and is in the core of the bargaining game between the
House, the Senate and the President. Thus, the location in the policy space of the
1 See, in particular, Gely and Spiller (1990a) and Ferejohn and Shipan (1990).
2 See, however, Gely and Spiller (1990a, section 2.6) where they start the analysis of a
discrete model of judicial decision making. Ferejohn and Shipan (1990) develop a similar
model for a single-chamber legislature.
administrative agency is irrelevant, as is the nature of the initial enacting legislation.
Confronted with a case concerning a particular set of issues, the Court's choice is only a
function of its current preferences, and of the current political composition of Congress
and the executive.
In this paper we explore the implications for agency discretion of relaxing those two
assumptions.3 We first present some of our previous results concerning agency discretion
when the Supreme Court has only the power to reverse or sustain a prior agency decision.
The Court, though, in making its decision behaves strategically, considering its impact on
the legislative process and on the subsequent policy outcome. We then generalize this model
by introducing a collective Supreme Court, decision costs and finally, a multi-layer judicial
system. For each of these cases we explore their implications for agency discretion.
The main results of this paper are as follows: First, while both agency preferences
and the location of the initial status-quo are important in determining the equilibrium, the
preferences of the Courts at the different levels and the magnitude of decision costs are
crucial in determining the extent of agency discretion. Decision costs play two roles. On
the one hand, decision costs expand the degree of discretion of the agency. On the other
hand, stochastic decision costs are, in this framework, a sufficient condition to generate
reversals of agency decisions. In the absence of stochastic decision costs, agency decisions
turn out, in equilibrium, to always be the final and unchallenged outcome. This result
clearly violates reality as important regulatory decisions by the Courts have involved the
reversal of previous administrative agency decisions. 4 Second, while judicial review
restricts the extent of agency discretion, it does not eliminate it. Multiple appeal levels,
however, further reduce the extent of agency discretion. In particular, the more opposed
Here we deal with statutory interpretation. For an analysis of the Supreme Court
constitutional decisions, see Gely and Spiller (1990b).
4 See Spiller (1990a) for an analysis of the role of the Court of Appeals in the regulation
of long distance telecommunications.
the justices' preferences at the different levels of the judiciary, the more constrained the
agency is to follow the initial legislative mandate. Finally, changes in the composition of
Congress may translate into changes in the optimal agency decision, even under judicial
review. Thus, judicial review does not necessarily safeguard the interests of the enacting
coalition.
II. A Simple Model of Agency Discretion
We start this section by analyzing a simple model of agency discretion in a bicameral
legislature, one dimensional policy space framework, without Presidential veto power. 5,6
In the next sections we consider multidimensional policy spaces, collective choice inside the
Court, judicial decision costs and a multi-layer judicial system.
Basic Assumptions
To simplify the analysis several assumptions about committee control are made.
First, we will assume that the issues in question are handled by a particular committee in
each house of Congress, with the committees having not only gate-keeping powers, but veto
powers as well. Thus, we will assume that they control the voting outcome in their
respective houses. 7 We follow standard assumptions about spatial preferences, by assuming
5 The assumption about the lack of veto power is just to simplify the exposition. In a one
dimensional issue space, Presidential veto does no qualitatively change the analysis. It only
changes the set of feasible legislative outcomes, as now to reverse either an administrative
agency or judicial decision, Congress needs Presidential consent. As will become clear below,
though, even in the absence of veto power, the President is influential through the control of
the administrative agencies.
6 This simple model is derived from Gelly and Spiller (1990a, Section 2.6). Interested
readers are refered to that article.
7 The modern theory of Congressional institutions (e.g. Weingast and Marshall (1988),
Shcpsle and Weingast (1987, 1989)) suggests that committees have substantial power over the
issues under their jurisdiction. In particular, because of their gate-keeping and veto power
(i.e. they may block legislation from being introduced, as well as kill or modify legislation
in conference), committee members' preferences may dominate issue specific legislation.
legislators to have well specified, single peaked, preference functions over the line
representing the policy issue. Let H and S in Figure 1 represent the ideal points of the
relevant committees of the House and the Senate respectively.
We assume, further, that the Court's preferences are also well specified and single
peaked over the policy space.8 The source of the Court's preferences, however, are
different from those of the legislators. While legislators "vote their district," Supreme Court
justices are not subject to reelection. We assume, then, that the Court's preferences are
essentially ideologically based.9 Let the Court's ideal point be represented by SC in Figure
1. We assume, furthermore, that the agency has well specified, single peaked, preferences
over the policy space, with different agency's ideal points represented by points A; in
Figure l. 10
We assume a sequential game composed of four stages as follows. In the initial stage
a certain legislation is passed that determines the initial status quo (represented by x in
Figure 1). In the second stage the agency moves by implementing the statute and choosing a
point (represented by x
a).
In the third stage the Court reviews the agency's decision. The
Seen in this light, these assumptions may not drastically violate reality. See, however,
Gilligan and Krehbiel (1988) for a different view of committees composition.
8 In general, this assumption is equivalent to assume that the Court is composed of a
single individual. In a single dimensional issue, however, this is an innocuous assumption as
the median justice would be the relevant one. Below we show that under some conditions,
that is not a restrictive assumption, as similar results can be obtained with a collective
Court.
9 While the justices' monetary well-being may be unrelated to the issue in question, it is
nevertheless reasonable to assume that they may have strong views about the substance of
the case. Furthermore, political considerations form part of the appointment process,
making it important to consider the political preferences of the justices. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that Supreme Court justices have stable preferences over the policy
space. See Gely and Spiller (1990a) for a more detailed discussion of the rationale for this
preference assumption.
10 The preferences of the administrative agency may reflect, to some extent, the preferences
of the President, as the President appoints the agency head, or the commissioners, and their
terms are relatively short. Observe, however, that those appointments usually require Senate
consent.
Court can either reverse or sustain the agency decision. If the Court reverses the agency
decision, it upholds the initial status-quo, x . If the Court sustains the agency decision, then
the new status quo becomes x a. In the fourth stage, Congress considers the Court's decision.
The Court's decision, then, determines the relevant status quo at the fourth stage. If the
two houses of Congress can find a policy outcome that improves upon the decision of the
Supreme Court, 11 then that policy becomes the final outcome, and it is the equilibrium to
the game. If Congress cannot find a policy that is preferred by both houses to the decision
of the Court, then the latter becomes the equilibrium. We assume that congressional
bargaining is efficient and individually rational. Efficiency implies that the outcome of
the bargaining has to be such that no other outcome could make both houses of Congress
better off. Individual rationality means that bargaining cannot make any house of
Congress worse off than the initial status quo. Thus, all outcomes to the congressional
bargaining game have to be inside the contract set represented in Figure 1 by the segment
[H,S]. Call it C(H,S).
Finally, we assume that at each stage each player behaves rationally, and solves the
game ahead. Thus, subgame perfection is assumed throughout.
Solving the Game
We solve the model backwards, by analyzing first the optimal action of Congress
given a previous decision by the Court. Consider a decision of the Court. Since the Court
can either uphold the agency decision, x
a,
or reverse it and thus uphold the status quo, x
,
we can describe the decision of the court as a function Z(x ,x
a
). This decision, then,
becomes the status quo to the bargaining game inside Congress. Thus if Z(x ,x
a) e C(H,S),
11 Observe that in the absence of decision costs the Court always reviews the decisions of
the administrative agency. Thus, the Court's decision may imply reversing or sustaining the
administrative agency's decision. In the next section we consider decision costs. In that case,
then, not granting certiorari implies letting the agency's decision stand.
then the Court's decision becomes the equilibrium, as by definition Congress cannot find an
alternative policy that makes both better off. If Z(x ,x a) £ C(H,S), then bargaining between
the House and the Senate will bring about an outcome inside C(H,S). Let G(x), G(x)eC(H,S),
represent the equilibrium to a congressional bargaining game with x representing the initial
status quo. Thus, if xeC(H,S), G(x)=x.
When the Court makes its decision it considers the optimal response of the
legislature. We have to consider four cases. If both x a and x £ C(H,S), then the Court's
decision will trigger congressional bargaining that will bring the outcome inside C(H,S).
The Court will then pick between x
a
and x
,
depending on which outcome provides the
Court with a higher utility, that is whether Usc(G(x
a)) J Usc(G(x )), where Usc(.)
represents the Supreme Court's utility function.
If x
a
and x 6 C(H,S), then the Court decision becomes the equilibrium, and it
chooses, again, between x
a
or x depending on which outcome provides the Court with a
higher utility. If, however, x
a
e C(H,S), but x
€
C(H,S), or x
a
<2 C(H,S) but x e C(H,S), the
decision of the Court may actually trigger congressional bargaining which will bring the
equilibrium inside C(H,S).
In general, then, the Court decides to reverse or not the agency's decision depending
on whether Usc(G(x ))J Usc(G(x a)).
Given the optimal strategies of the Court and Congress, the agency will make its
policy decision such that it will maximize its utility. The agency knows that would the
Court reverse its decision, the legislative outcome will depend on whether x is in C(H,S) or
not. If x is in C(H,S), then x =G(x ) becomes the final outcome. If, however, x g C(H,S),
then would the Court reverse x
a,
G(x )^x
, becomes the equilibrium. Thus, in general,
reversing the agency decision implies that G(x ) becomes the final outcome.
Assume, first, that x e C(H,S). Let SC(y) (A(y)) represent those points in the policy
space that the Court (agency) prefers to the point y. If SC(x )nA(x ) = 0, then the agency
cannot make a policy decision other than x , as it would be reversed by the Court without
triggering further legislative move. This will be the case if the ideal points of the agency
and the Court are on different sides of x .
If, however, SC(x )nA(x ) * 0, then the agency will pick that point in SC(x )nC(H,S)
such that maximizes its own utility. Thus, if A e SC(x )nC(H,S), then x a = A, and it
becomes the equilibrium. This is the extreme case of agency discretion, as marginal changes
in A change the equilibrium policy outcome. If, however, A £ SC(x )nC(H,S), then x
a
will
be at the boundary of SC(x )nC(H,S) closer to A, with marginal changes in A not changing
the equilibrium outcome.
Consider now the case where x <£. C(H,S). This could be the case following changes
in the composition of congress, or of the relevant committee. In this case, if the agency's
decision is reversed by the Court, then the equilibrium is G(x ). Thus, there are two cases to
consider. If SC(G(x )nA(G(x ) = 0, then G(x ) becomes the equilibrium. In this case, the
agency cannot make a decision that makes the Court and itself better off over the credible
legislative move. Thus, it cannot do better than setting the administration's policy equal to
the policy that would come out of congressional bargaining. If, however,
SC(G(x ))nA(G(x )) * 0, then there are points in SC(G(x ))nC(H,S) that the agency will
prefer to G(x ). In particular, if A e SC(G(x ))nC(H,S) then the ideal point of the agency
becomes the equilibrium. Alternative, the equilibrium is in the boundary of
SC(G(x ))nC(H,S) closer to A.
Thus, we can state:
Proposition 1: Under the assumptions described in the text, the unique
equilibrium to the game is that point in SC(G(x ))nC(H,S) such that
maximizes the agency's utility.
Assuming subgame perfection, then, we obtain that the agency's decision always
becomes the equilibrium to the game. This result does not imply that the agency actually
has any discretion left. In particular, if the agency's and the Court's ideal points are on
different sides of the credible legislative threat (G(x )), then the credible legislative threat
becomes the equilibrium. Agency discretion may exist, however, when both the agency's
and the Court's ideal points are on the same side of the credible legislative threat.
Figure 1 presents a feasible configuration on a one-dimensional policy space. In
Figure 1 x is a candidate for equilibrium as it is inside C(H,S). The ideal point of the
Supreme Court is represented by SC and it is located inside C(H,S). Hence, if the Court
could make decisions as in SG, the equilibrium would be SC.
Consider first an agency location like Av to the right of x . Since x is a feasible
equilibrium, the agency cannot do better but to set the equilibrium to x . Would the agency
decide on a point to the right of x , even if it is inside C(H,S), it would be reversed by the
Court as it prefers x to any point to its right.
Consider now an agency position to the left of SC and outside SC(x ), like A 3 . An
administrative policy represented by A 3 is untenable. The Court would reverse A 3 as it
prefers x to A 3 . Furthermore, if the Court upholds A 3 , then it will be reversed by Congress.
The agency, however, will be worse off under G(A 3) than under, say, H. Thus, the agency
will not pick any point x
a
<H. Furthermore, since H is the boundary of SC(x )nC(H,S)
closest to A 3 , H will become the equilibrium. As A 3 moves to the right, the equilibrium
remains H as long as A < H. For H < A < x
,
the equilibrium is A, and for A > x
,
the
equilibrium is x
.
Figure 2 provides a representation of the equilibrium. The vertical axis reflects the
equilibrium to this game as A is increased from the far left to the far right.
Let us compare the equilibrium to this particular case with the equilibrium that
would develop in the absence of judicial review. Since the status quo, x
,
is in C(H,S), any
point in C(H,S) could be a feasible agency policy. The dotted lines represent the
equilibrium to the game without judicial review. Thus, in this particular case, the Court
constraints the agency to points in C(H,S) (weakly) to the left of x .
8
An interesting feature of this case, though, is that the preferences of the Supreme
Court do not matter in the equilibrium. They would, however, if the ideal point of the
Court was such that, for example, SC(x )cC(H,S). In that case the left boundary of SC(x )
becomes the equilibrium for values of A to the left of that point. Thus, marginal changes in
the ideal point of the Court would imply marginal changes in the equilibrium policy
outcome.
Finally, observe that judicial review does not assure policy stability. Would the
composition of Congress change, so will, in general, the equilibrium outcome. For example,
if following a change in Congress x is not in C(H,S), then G(x ) becomes the relevant status
quo, even without a Congressional action. G(x ), however, takes into account the new
political balance in Congress.
Another main implication of this analysis is that in general a linear regression of
policy decisions on characteristics of the Court, Congress and the Agency is plagued with
misspecification problems, as the relationship between policy outcomes, preferences and the
initial status quo is not only non-linear, but also discontinuous.
III. Extensions
In this section we consider several extensions of the simple model just described.
First, we extend the model to two dimensional issue space. We show that the results are
essentially the same as those for the single dimension model. We then consider a collective
Supreme Court, and analyze voting inside the Court. We show that under some conditions,
the same qualitative results hold true, where the preferences of just a key (median) justice
are what constrain the agency. We then explore the implications of decision costs and show
their relevance to understand agency reversals. Finally, we explore the implications of a
multi-layer judiciary and show how it further constraints administrative agencies' policy
discretion.
a. A Multidimensional Policy Space 12
In this section we expand our preference assumptions and assume that each
legislator, the Court and the agency have preferences that are characterized by strictly
convex iso-utility contours in R 2 . As above, we call H the ideal point of the House, S the
ideal point of the Senate, SC the ideal point of the Court and A the ideal point of the
agency.
Unconstrained bargaining between the two houses of Congress would bring about an
outcome in their contract curve, C(H,S). Observe that if Congressional preferences are
represented by circular iso-utility contours, then C(H,S) will be a straight line. For
simplicity, and to assure uniqueness of equilibria, we make such an assumption in this and
the next section. Again, let G(x) represent the deterministic outcome to a bargaining
process when x is the status quo.
The game has the same structure as before. It can be seen that again there are two
cases, depending on whether x belongs or not to C(H,S).
If x e C(H,S), then if A(x )nSC(x )nC(H,S) = 0, then x is the equilibrium. If,
however, A(x )nSC(x )nC(H,S) ? 0, then the equilibrium is given by that point in
SC(x )nC(H,S) that maximizes the utility of the agency.
If, on the other hand, x £ C(H,S), then x is not a credible legislative threat.
Instead, G(x ) is the credible legislative threat, and the following two cases are the relevant
ones. If A(G(x ))nSC(G(x ))nC(H,S) = 0, then G(x ) is the equilibrium. If, instead
A(G(x ))nSC(G(x ))nC(H,S) * 0, then the equilibrium is given by the point in
SC(G(x ))nC(H,S) such that it maximizes the utility of the agency.
Thus, in general, and as in the previous section, the equilibrium is given by that
point in SC(G(x ))nC(H,S) that maximizes the agency's utility. Thus we can state,
i
i
12 For a more detailed discussion of this case, see Gely and Spiller (1990a).
10
Proposition 2: Under the assumptions discussed above, Proposition 1 holds
also for a two-dimensional issue space.
Figure 3 presents a case where x £ C(H,S). We observe that the fact that the Court
can reverse the agency's decision, and thus trigger congressional action towards G(x ),
restricts the set of feasible agency decisions. Thus, the results of the previous sections are
not too sensitive to the dimensionality of the policy space.
b. Voting in the Court.
So far we have assumed that the Court can be represented as a single individual.
This is a proper assumption in a one dimensional issue, where the median voter theorem
would apply to the Court as well. Consider, instead an issue in R 2 . Let the court be
composed of three justices, with ideal points represented as J
i?
i=l,3. For simplicity assume
that the President cannot sustain a veto. Thus, all feasible congressional outcomes have to
be in C(H,S). Spiller and Gely (1990) analyze voting in the Court, when the Court can
actually pick any point in the policy space. There it is shown, that in such a case, given the
current assumptions about congressional preferences, there is a unique equilibrium given by
the median justice's projection of its ideal point onto C(H,S). The main thrust of that paper
is that as long as only proposals that would not be reversed by Congress are accepted in the
justices' voting game, cycling is eliminated, and a unique majority rule equilibrium exists.
Here, however, justices cannot pick their most preferred policy, but rather their
voting is on whether or not to reverse the agency's decision. To solve this game we assume,
as before, that all justices know the outcome of the subsequent stage when Congress
bargains for an alternative policy from that of the Court.
Let now WSC(x) represent the winning set of x in the Court. That is, WSC(x) are all
those points in R 2 that a majority of the justices prefer to x. See Figure 4. Again, as in
previous sections, if A(G(x ))nWSC(G(x ))nC(H,S) = 0, then G(x ) is the equilibrium, as the
11
agency cannot find an alternative policy to G(x ) that makes it better off without being
reversed (with G(x ) being again the outcome). If, however, A(G(x ))nWSC(G(x ))nC(H,S) *
0, then the equilibrium is that point in WSC(G(x ))nC(H,S) such that maximizes the agency's
utility. Observe that in Figure 4 x =G(x ) and WSC(x )nC(H,S)=SC 2(x )nC(H,S), where
SC 2(x ) are all those policy points that justice J 2 prefers to x . Thus, only marginal changes
in the preferences of J 2 and not in any of the other justices matter in determining the
equilibrium. J 2 , then, can be called the "median" justice. Thus, under our assumptions,
collective choice inside the Court does not seem to increase the extent of agency
discretion. 13
We can then state,
Proposition 3: Under the Assumptions of Section III. a., the unique equilibrium
is that point in WSC(G(x ))nC(H,S) that maximizes the agency's utility.
Furthermore, even though there are multiple justices, only marginal changes
in the preferences of a key justice impact upon the set WSC(G(x ))nC(H,S),
and hence limits agency discretion.
c. Decision Costs at the Court
In this section we extend the previous model to consider decision costs at the Court.
The Supreme Court among all Courts in the US judiciary is the only one that can actually
decide which cases to consider. There has been substantial political and legal research
trying to understand the Certiorari decision and how it relates to the final decisions on the
cases themselves. 14 This literature, however, has focused almost exclusively on justices'
13 See Spiller and Gely (1990) for a more detailed analysis of collective choice inside the
Court when the Court is unconstrained in its policy choice. Note also, that would the President
have veto power, then feasible legislative outcomes consists of all those points in the core of
the bargaining game among the House, the Senate and the President. Call it C(H,S,P). The
agency can choose points in WSC(G(x ))nC(H,S,P), which will usually consist of an area in R 2
rather than a line. Marginal changes in any of the justices, however, will usually imply a
change in that set.
14 See Schubert (1959) for one of the first quantitative studies of the Certiorari process. For
more recent empirical analyses see Brenner and Krol (1989), Palmer (1982), Songer (1979), Teger
12
voting strategies without considering further the interaction between the Supreme Court
and the other institutions of government. 15 In this section we develop the implications
that the Certiorari process has for discretion at the agency level when the Court is
constrained in its decision set to either reverse or sustain the agency's decision. 16
To simplify the analysis we again deal with a single-dimensional issue. All our other
assumptions are as in section I. We assume here that considering and making a decision on a
case implies a cost equal to T. To simplify the analysis we first assume that T is
deterministic. Below we relax this assumption and explore the implications of stochastic
decision costs. Thus, if the Court makes a decision in the real line such that the outcome is
E, and E is valued by the Supreme Court as USC(E), then the net gain from making the
decision E is USC(E)-T.
The main effect of introducing the decision costs T is that it expands the set of
policies that the Court prefers to say G(x ). Consider the case as in Figure 5, where for
simplicity Usc(x)=-|x-SC|. Now if the Court reverses an agency decision and the outcome
becomes G(x ), its utility level becomes Usc(G(x ))-T. Thus, call *M and M* (*M<M*) those
points such that solve Usc(m)=Usc(G(x ))-T. An agency decision that falls in
[*M,M*]nC(H,S) would then not be reversed by the Court. Observe that, by construction
M*>G(x ). Thus, even though the ideal point of the Supreme Court is to the left of G(x ),
the Court will accept an agency decision to the right of G(x ).
There are then two cases to consider. If A^*M,M*]nC(H,S), then A becomes the
equilibrium. If, instead, A«[*M,M*]nC(H,S), then the equilibrium becomes the boundary of
and Kosinski (1980), and Ulmer (1984).
15 See, however, Caldeira and Wright (1988), who consider the role of organized interest
groups in the Certiorari process.
16 See Spiller (1991) for an analysis of the implications of the Certiorari process for the
extent of discretion of lower courts when the Supreme Court is unconstrained in its decision
making ability.
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[*M,M*]nC(H,S) closest to A. Thus, we can state:
Proposition 4: The unique equilibrium to the game with decision costs is that
point in SC(M*)nC(H,S), such that maximizes the agency's utility, where
M*={m/Usc(m)=Usc(G(x ))-T, M*>G(x )}.
The introduction of decision costs then does not change qualitatively the main
results of the previous sections. Agency discretion, however, is increased, with the extent of
agency discretion depending now on the level of decision costs as well as on the shape of the
Supreme Court' utility function. Still, perfect information and subgame perfection rules
out reversals by the Court. The agency, foreseeing the evolution of the game will make a
decision such that it becomes the equilibrium. That is, in the current framework, the Court
will never grant Cert. To obtain reversals, though, some randomness is required.
Stochastic Decision Costs
In this section we expand the model to allow for stochastic decision costs. In the
previous sections we showed that with perfect information and exogenously given decision
costs, the Supreme Court, in equilibrium, will not grant Cert to any case, as the agency will
strategically chose its decisions from the no-Cert set. When decision costs are unknown to
the agency, then Certiorari will be granted in those cases when decision costs are lower than
expected. The agency, however, will take the distribution of decision costs into account in
making its decision.
To show the workings of the model in this case, assume that the ideal point of the
agency is to the right of the congressional contract set, i.e., x
a
>S. Observe that if the Court
grants Cert and reverses the agency decision, the outcome becomes G(x ). It is trivial to see
that the Court will not grant Cert so as to sustain the agency decision. 17 Assume, now
17
If x
a
e C(H,S), then, if Cert is granted and x
a
is sustained, x a becomes the equilibrium
as Congress cannot find an alternative that is preferred by both houses to x a. If x a £ C(H,S),
then sustaining x
a
will imply that Congress will reverse it and set G(x
a) as the policy. But such
14
that the preferences of the agency are given by UA(x/A) = -|x-A|, and those of the
Supreme Court by U sc(x/SC)= -jx-SC|. Let furthermore T be given by T=T*W, with F(i/)
(f(i/)) being i/s cumulative distribution (density) function. 18 From the assumptions about
Supreme Court preferences, the upper limit to the no-Cert region is given by M* =
G(x )+T*+i/ for values of u such that G(x )+T*+v < S, where it is assumed as in the
previous Figures that S > H. For those values of u such that G(x )+T*+v > S, the upper limit
to the no-Cert regions is S.
As discussed above, subgame perfection rules out agency decisions outside the
contract set C(H,S). We can then concentrate on x
a
eC(H,S). Thus, if x
a
>M* then the final
outcome is G(x ), and the utility of the agency is given by -(A-G(x )). If, however,
x
a
e[*M,M*]nC(H,S), then the agency's decision becomes the final outcome, and the utility
level of the agency is given by -(A-x
a).
The agency's tradeoff is as follows: It can make a
decision relatively close to its ideal point but have a relatively high probability of being
reversed (and hence of sustaining an outcome much distant from its ideal point), or it can
choose a decision that, while being further away from its ideal point, has a higher
probability of not being reversed. It is straightforward to see, then, that the expected
utility of the agency from a decision x
a,
x
a
>G(x ), is given by x a-A - (x a-G(x ))F(x a-G(x )-
T*), where the assumption that A>G(x ) is used to rule out x a<G(x ) cases.
Maximization of the expected utility of the agency implies that the optimal decision
x
a
is given by
a policy could be achieved even if the Court did not take the case.
18 Observe that the distributional assumption may violate the fact that T>0. The
distribution of u should actually be truncated with a lower bound k>-T*.
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The term F(x)/f(x) is the hazard ratio which is usually assumed to be non-decreasing
in x. 19 Thus, under that assumption we obtain that the optimal value of x
a
is non-
decreasing in T* and G(x ). That is, increases in the initial status quo would (weakly)
increase the optimal decision at the agency level, as will increases in Supreme Court
decision costs. Similar analysis can be used to derive the equilibria for the other cases. In
this case, though, marginal changes in the ideal point of the Supreme Court do not affect
the agency's optimal decision. It can be seen, though, that if H<A<SC, then increases in SC
will increase the optimal x
a
. To see this, observe that the optimal x
a
must be less than SC.
Thus, the probability of Cert is given by the probability that x a < SC-(G(x )+T*+i/-SC)
which is given by F(2SC-G(x )-T*-x
a). In this case, then, increases in the ideal point of the
Supreme Court increases the optimal agency decision. Increases in.the expected value of
decision costs, though, reduces x
a
. Finally, the effect of a change in the initial status quo
on the optimal x
a
is uncertain. On the one hand, increases in the status quo, holding
constant SC, reduces the probability of granting Cert for a given x
a
<SC, thus reducing x
a
.
On the other hand, it increases the disutility from Cert as it moves the final outcome
further away from A, thus increasing the optimal agency decision.
To summarize, stochastic judicial decision costs are crucial to obtain realistic models
of agency discretion. The higher the average decision costs the higher the extent of agency
discretion.
19 This property is satisfied by many distributions, like the normal, the uniform, the
exponential and the logistic.
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d. A Multi-layer Judiciary
The previous models analyze the interaction between Congress, the Supreme Court
and an administrative agency. In fact, though, there is an intermediate step before
administrative cases go to the Supreme Court, namely an appeal to the Appeal Courts. In
this section we analyze the role of Appeal Courts as further reviewers of administrative
agencies. We show that, in the same way that the existence of the Supreme Court restricts
agency discretion over and above what Congress could do, the existence of an intermediate
judicial screening process further restricts the extent of agency discretion. Furthermore,
the more opposed (in relation to the credible legislative outcome) the preferences of the
justices at the different levels of the judicial hierarchy, the more the judiciary limits
agency discretion.
We start by assuming, again, a single dimension policy space, and that the Appeal
Courts has well specified, and single peaked preferences over the policy space. The source
of Appeal Court preferences is similar to that of the Supreme Court, namely ideology. 20
Call AC its ideal point. Apart from the fact that the Supreme Court decisions are reviewed
by Congress while those of the Appeal Court by the Supreme Court, there is a basic
difference between the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal. While the latter must
review all cases that are appealed to it, that is not the case for the Supreme Court. Thus,
the Appeal Court cannot save time or effort by not considering cases that it would like to
uphold. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, can do it. Thus, for simplicity, we will
assume that there are no relevant decision costs at the Appeal Court level.
The game, now, has five stages. In the first stage a certain legislation is passed that
determines x . In the second stage an agency makes a decision which is reviewed by the
Appeal Courts at stage three. At stage four, the decision of the Court of Appeals is brought
20 See the discussion in and surrounding footnote 9.
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to the Supreme Court where it has to decide whether to grant Cert, and if so, to reverse it.
At stage five, Congress bargains over an alternative policy.
We solve this model by backward induction in the same way as the previous sections.
We analyze first the optimal decision for the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court can only
choose between two alternatives, x a or G(x ). The decision at the appeal level, however,
determines which strategy to follow. To see this, observe that Appeal Court decisions can
be of two types. It can uphold the agency decision or reverse it. If it upholds the agency
decision, then if the Supreme Court grants Cert it will only be to reverse the agency
decision, such that G(x ) becomes the final outcome. If the Supreme Court does not grant
Cert, then G(x
a) becomes the equilibrium. Thus, given that the agency decision was upheld
by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Court will grant Cert, and reverse the Appeal Courts
only if Usc(G(x ))-T > Usc(G(x
a)).
Thus, from the definition of the set [*M,M*], an agency decision that falls in
[*M,M*]nC(H,S) and that is upheld by the Appeal Court will not be granted Cert, and hence
will constitute the equilibrium. On the other hand, the Supreme Court will grant-Cm and
reverse all decisions that are not in [*M,M*] that were upheld by the Court of Appeals. See
Figure 6. Figure 6 presents a case where congressional preferences do not bind.
Consider, now, an agency decision that was reversed by the Appeals Court. If the
Supreme Court does not grant Cert, then G(x ) will become the equilibrium. If, however,
the Supreme Court grants Cert, it will do so only to reverse the Appeals Court and restore
G(x
a) as the final outcome. Thus, given that the Court of Appeals reversed the agency
decision, the Supreme Court will grant Cert only if Usc(G(x a)) - T > Usc(G(x )). That is,
only if even after paying the decision costs T, the Supreme Court prefers the agency
decision to the credible legislative outcome. Call *N and N*, *N<N*, the boundaries to this
set. See Figure 6.
Finally, observe that if x
a
is such that Usc(G(x ))-T < Usc(G(x
a)) < Usc(G(x ))+T,
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then the Supreme Court will not grant Cert, independently of the Appeal Court's decision.
There are then basically three areas with different optimal Supreme Court strategies:
a) grant Cert if the agency was reversed: Usc(G(x a)) - T > Usc(G(x ));
b) grant Cert if the agency was upheld: Usc(G(x ))-T > U sc(G(x a));
c) do not grant Cert: Usc(G(x ))-T < Usc(G(x a)) < Usc(G(x ))+T.
The Appeals Court, then, when considering its optimal decision takes into account
the optimal response of the Supreme Court to its own decision.
Consider, first, an agency decision such that Usc(G(x
a))
- T > Usc(G(x )). Would the
Appeal Court try to reverse it, the Supreme Court will reverse it back. Thus, either way the
equilibrium is G(x
a
). Thus, we assume that in this case the Court of Appeals follows the
Supreme Court and upholds the agency decision. Consider now an agency decision such that
Usc(G(x ))-T > Usc(G(x a)). Would the Appeal Court uphold it, the Supreme Court will
reverse it and the final outcome will be G(x ). Thus, we assume that in this case the Court
of Appeals again follows the Supreme Court and reverses the agency decision. Finally,
consider an agency decision such that Usc(G(x ))-T < Usc(G(x
a)) < U
sc(G(x ))+T. In this
case, the Appeal Court decision will not be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Thus, the
Appeal Court will uphold the agency decision only if UAC(G(x
a
))>UAC(G(x )). Otherwise it
will reverse it and the equilibrium will become G(x ).
Consider a final outcome that was achieved through reversing an agency decision
(either by one of the Courts or by Congress). Since the agency could have achieved that
outcome directly, we can rule out agency decisions outside C(H,S) as well as those that
trigger reversals at either judicial level. Thus, the set of non-reversable agency decisions is
given by
{Usc(x
a
)-T > Usc(G(x ))} u {Usc(G(x ))-T < U sc(x a)}
u {{Usc(G(x ))-T < Usc(x
a)
< U sc(G(x ))+T}n{UAC(x a)>UAC(G(x ))}},
where by the previous discussion, we are assured that x
a
e C(H,S). The first term involves
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those policies that are safeguarded by the Supreme Court. The second term are those
policies that are always blocked by the Supreme Court; and the third term are those policies
that the Supreme Court will never grant Cert and that are prefered by the Appeal Court to
G(x
a).
The agency, then, chooses the point in that set that maximizes its own utility.
Observe that since the set of non-reversable decisions is not compact, uniqueness of
equilibria is not assured. For example, assume that AC<*M Then agency decisions in, for
example, the segment [*M,x ] constitute feasible equilibria. Assume, now that the ideal
point of the agency is equidistant from x and *N, such tat UA(x )=UA(*N). Either x or *N
are non-reversable agency decisions, and thus each constitute an equilibrium.
Observe that while there are regions where the Supreme Court would grant Cert, in
this framework the Supreme Court never finds it optimal to grant Cert, except for some
knife-edge cases.
It can be seen that multiplicity of judicial reviews further restricts the extent of
agency discretion. To see this, observe that if only the Supreme Court would review the
agencies, then all points between [*M,M*] would be feasible agency decisions. With an
intermediate layer of judicial review, parts of the No-Cert regions are not feasible agency
decisions any more. Figure 7 compares the equilibria with and without the intermediate
level of judicial review. Figure 7 depicts the equilibria for AC<*M as the ideal point of the
agency increases. Without the Appeal Court, the equilibria is equal to A for Ae[*M,M*],
and it is represented, in Figure 7, by the narrow line. The solid line represents theequilibria
that would develop for AC<*M. Observe that the main difference is that the region [N*,M*]
is not feasible any more. Observe that would AC>M*, then the only region that is out of
bounds for the administrative agency is [*M,x ]. Since x -*M<M*-N*, the extent of agency
discretion is relatively larger when the two courts are on the same side of the status quo.
In general, then, holding constant the preferences of the Supreme Court, the extent
of agency discretion increases as AC diverges from G(x ). It reaches its highest level when
20
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t
both SC and AC are to the same side of the credible congressional outcome, G(x ). That is,
agency discretion is largest when both courts would like to move policy in the same
direction away from the status quo. When their desired direction of change is opposite, i.e.,
they are on different sides of G(x ), then, the maximum attainable level of agency
discretion is smaller.
To summarize, the existence of several intermediate judicial layers has the effect of
further reducing the extent of agency discretion. The extent of reduction depends,
however, on the relative location of the two Court's ideal points.
III. Final Comments
When the Court can only reverse or sustain an agency decision, the agency has
substantial discretion. The Court will not support the status quo in all cases, as changes
away from the status quo may make both the Court and the agency better off. The Court
will sustain the status quo, however, when the agency's interests are in moving policy away
from the direction most preferred by the Court. The main thrust of Spiller and Gely's
framework remains here as, first, the Court will follow election results as they change the
set of feasible legislative decisions. Second, the Court, while behaving strategically, is not
able to impose its preferences, but rather is constrained by the remaining institutions of
government. This paper also develops the role of decision costs in both increasing agency
discretion as well as in generating judicial reversal of administrative agency policies.
Finally, the paper shows the role of multiple layers of judicial review. Even though each of
those layers may be composed of ideologically motivated justices, multiple levels of judicial
review further restrict agency discretion.
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FIGURE 3
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FIGURE 5
AGENCY DISCRETION WITH
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